Common claims, tested against the source — without mockery.
“The theft was discovered when refund requests bounced / an oil company complained.”
The GCT's books showed nothing wrong as late as 9 October 2022 (balance letter 1631). The theft surfaced only when the acting minister — prompted and guided by the advisor to the finance minister — ordered the *bank account* audited (18–25 Sep 2022). Testimony
“The funds did not belong to the state. (the principal defendant's defence)”
The amounts were statutory tax security deposits held in trust under Law 1/2014; unclaimed balances revert to the treasury by Law 6/2019. None of the five companies held any deposits (GCT records), and every major oil company confirmed in writing it authorised no one.
“Former minister Ali Allawi facilitated the theft.”
The documents show the opposite: he created the oversight committee (5 Aug 2021), confronted the officials (28 Oct), demanded the paper trail (1 Nov), banned all refunds without his signature (4 Nov 2021), alerted the PMO (5 Nov), and ordered investigations (7 Nov). The theft continued only because his ban was hidden and defied inside the GCT. When he returned to Baghdad and demanded the evidence against him, none was produced and the charges were dropped. Testimony
“The advisor to the finance minister worked at / ran Rafidain Bank.”
He was a consultant employed by a private American consulting firm (DAI, under USAID's IGPA/TAKAMUL) seconded to the Minister's office; his terms of reference expressly excluded executive authority; he could not sign documents or instruct any state institution. His Rafidain involvement was four defined reform projects (Ishtar Gate contract analysis, bylaws, Qi Card data migration, HR) — never operations or management.
“The Nasik Bank connection proves a corrupt network.”
False inference. The bank is majority-owned by Iraqi state institutions (ownership published on the bank's site). The advisor served ~6 months in 2019 as startup CEO for a digital-bank plan and resigned when the strategy changed — before Dr Allawi became minister.
“Nour Zuhair's release was a lawful settlement that recovered the money.”
Partially true, wholly misleading. Documented recoveries: IQD 182.7bn + $125m — a fraction of IQD 3.7tn. He then left Iraq, was sentenced in absentia, and was covered by the 2025 amnesty settlement. The 'instalments' never completed; the release enabled the escape.
“The stolen total exceeds $5 billion.”
Unverified. The figure traces to one MP's 'preliminary information' remark (23 Nov 2022) and was recycled by press in 2025. No published audit substantiates it. The documented, audited figure is IQD 3,701,380,882,000. A follow-up audit of the older al-Ahrar account was announced in 2022; its outcome has never been published.
“The Kadhimi government's people ran the scheme.”
Contested — and inverted at its core. The scheme was designed inside the GCT (documents) and protected politically (testimony). The Kadhimi-era finance ministry produced the ban that would have stopped it; the acting minister and PM Kadhimi ordered and protected the investigation that exposed it; the report was filed one day before Parliament removed the acting minister. Courts later sentenced Kadhimi's office director in absentia; the PM's private secretary is exculpated by the advisor's direct testimony. The site records both the verdicts and the evidence. Testimony
“Enormous secret payments — '$500m to the PM's brother for the release'; '$70m to the Speaker for the vote'.”
Unverified allegations circulating in social media and commentary. No official finding or established-press investigation substantiates them. They are recorded here as allegations only — alongside the documented facts they seek to explain: a release that enabled escape, and a removal vote one day after the report. Unverified allegationPress record
“It was impossible for the minister not to know.”
The theft was recorded nowhere the minister could see: not in the GCT's books (never entered), not in reports to his office (never sent), not from the bank's leadership (weekly meetings, silence), not from the Integrity Commission (clean reports, Aug & Dec 2021), not from the CBI. It was visible in exactly one place — the bank statements — which reached neither the minister nor the GCT's accounts department. That is why the 2022 investigation began at the bank.